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*32ABSTRACT
Long before the United States engaged in counterinsurgency overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States engaged in
counterinsurgency domestically against blacks. The history of America is a history of enduring conflict between black
insurgents and white counterinsurgents. This conflict began centuries ago with the forced transport of enslaved blacks to
America’s shores. From the beginning, whites employed all levers of national power including laws to suppress black
resistance. The laws became counterinsurgency weapons launched against blacks in an internal conflict lasting generations.
I. INTRODUCTION
America’s focus in recent years has been on the United States counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But America
began counterinsurgency operations centuries ago when blacks were forcibly shipped to the New World. Thus began the war on
blacks.1 Whites fought to subjugate blacks; blacks fought to be free.2 Whites believed their superiority justified their
subjugation of blacks; blacks believed *33 they too should live as a free people.3
White superiority meant whites had to be victorious in their conflict with blacks. White superiority was exemplified by Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Sr., born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and a leading literary figure of his time. He gave a lecture in 1855
describing blacks as an “inferior natural tribe of men.”4 Between blacks and whites, Holmes declared, “our sympathies will go
with our own color first.”5 Holmes exclaimed, “the white man must be the master.”6 Not surprisingly, blacks resisted. As the
U.S. Army Guerrilla Warfare Handbook explains, resistance is to be expected in a nation internally divided by the “violation of
rights” or “oppression of one group by the dominant ... force.”7 Blacks resisted the violation of their rights by the dominant
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white force.
These two opposing forces joined in conflict amidst the backdrop of inveterate white ethnocentrism. The conflict was not a
conventional war with large standing armies of black and white soldiers fighting pitched battles.8 Rather, it was an
unconventional war involving black insurgency and white counterinsurgency forces opposing each other over the span of
centuries. As the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency manual concedes, counterinsurgency campaigns are often protracted and
arduous.9
In this unconventional war, whites used the law as a weapon against blacks. In any struggle, law becomes a weapon used by the
ruling class to achieve its ends.10 A successful counterinsurgency requires “bringing all instruments of national power to bear.”11
White counterinsurgents have used the law as an instrument of national power against black insurgents.12 This accords with
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine that recognizes the law as a “powerful potential tool” to use *34 against insurgents.13
The white goal of mastering blacks produced racial conflict.14 This article does not seek to identify all instances of racial
conflict between blacks and whites, but to identify some major aspects that explicate the military nature of this conflict. The
nature of this conflict is a white counterinsurgency campaign against black insurgents, as explained in Part II. Part III elucidates
how America’s founding documents supported the counterinsurgency campaign against blacks. Part IV surveys how
counterinsurgency tactics combined with laws were used against blacks from slavery to the current period. Part V examines
why the counterinsurgency campaign against blacks is ongoing despite seeming progress in race relations. Part VI proposes
policies benefitting blacks who have endured a long-term counterinsurgency campaign waged against them. In the end, the
hope is for the racial chasm separating the warring sides to be closed.15
II. A COUNTERINSURGENCY NATION
U.S. history is a history of counterinsurgency. The United States was formed from an insurgent-counterinsurgent struggle
between colonial insurgents combating the counterinsurgent British Empire.16 After gaining independence, white insurgent
colonists were the counterinsurgents battling black insurgents who sought their own freedom. Sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, in
his seminal work An American Dilemma, described blacks as “insurgents.”17 Myrdal’s “insurgent” description is apt because an
insurgency is “a power struggle between a nonruling group and their ruling authority,”18 and in America there has been an
ongoing struggle between the black nonruling group and the white ruling authority.19Counterinsurgency is military,
paramilitary, and other actions taken by a government to defeat insurgents,”20 and whites have used military, paramilitary, and
other actions including *35 crafting an oppressive legal regime to defeat black insurgents.21
III. THE FOUNDING DOCUMENTS AS COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCUMENTS
America’s founding documents, in relation to blacks, were counterinsurgency documents supporting a legal regime constructed
to maintain white dominance. The Articles of Confederation was a counterinsurgency document because it permitted states to
retain control over domestic institutions such slavery.22
The U.S. Constitution was also a counterinsurgency document because it supported and entrenched slavery within the United
States.23 Like the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution allowed states the prerogative to maintain order within their
borders,24 which meant they retained their authority to control slaves.25 Moreover, if a state required assistance, the Constitution
obligated the national government to assist states in suppressing domestic disorders--including slave insurrections.26 The
Constitution created a union of states bound to support each other against black resistance.27
Finally, the Declaration of Independence was also a counterinsurgency document because it did not declare independence for
blacks, but instead voiced fears of black insurrection. The Declaration accused King George of “excit[ing] domestic
insurrection among us,”--a reference to Lord Dunmore’s offer of freedom to pro-British slaves. Lord Dunmore, the royal
governor of Virginia, proclaimed in 1775, “I do hereby declare all indentured servants, negroes, or others, (appertaining to
Rebels,) free that are able and willing to bear arms, they joining His Majesty’s troops.”28 Slaves throughout the colonies
responded and joined British army and navy forces.29 Thomas Jefferson greatly feared slave rebellions and was *36 terrified by
Lord Dunmore’s proclamation. Jefferson’s earlier draft of the Declaration was even more emphatic in accusing King George of
“exciting those very people [the imported slaves] to rise in arms among us.”30
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IV. CENTURIES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
From the beginning, blacks and whites have lived in a persistent state of conflict because blacks did not accept being enslaved
within a white-imposed racial caste system.31 Constant resistance by blacks “made life a nightmare to those in charge of these
Negroes.”32 Whites feared blacks rebelling33 and thus devised various counterinsurgency stratagems including passing
oppressive laws to control blacks.34 The stage was set for centuries of racial counterinsurgency in America.
A. The Slavery Period
White suppression of blacks began in the late 1600s with the introduction of slavery.35 The slave system was effectively a
declaration of war on the black population.36 Blacks were the only ethnic group that did not arrive in America of its own free
will.37 As Alexis de Tocqueville observed, “[n]o African came in freedom to the shores of the New World.”38 Slavery was a
cruel and perverse period in American history.39 Blacks despised and resisted this cruel system of exploitation.40 Survival was
itself a form of resistance.41 Other forms of resistance included work slowdowns, destruction of tools, flight, arson,
assassinations, and insurrections.42
*37 Whites constructed an oppressive legal regime to deter black resistance.43 States enacted slave codes that were a principal
deterrent to black rebellion.44 Slaves could not, among other restrictions, leave plantations without permission, assemble in
large numbers, or bear arms.45 The anti-black legal regime allowed whites to deploy their forces with “blitzkrieg-like
efficiency” in the counterinsurgency campaign against blacks.46
1. Outsourcing the Rendition of Blacks
U.S. counterinsurgency strategy calls for capturing the enemy.47 In the War on Terror, one method the United States used to
capture the enemy was outsourcing renditions of suspected terrorists.48 In the case involving Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, a top aide to
Osama bin Laden, the United States relied on a foreign intelligence service to capture this senior Al Qaeda operative and deliver
him to the Central Intelligence Agency.49
Likewise, Europeans and American colonists outsourced the rendition of blacks in Africa. It was impractical for a relatively
small number of white sailors in distant lands to capture millions of black slaves, but white demand for slave labor required a
solution.50 The answer was outsourcing the kidnapping of Africans to other Africans in West Africa to sell to European and
American traders.51 Different tribes and villages battled each other to capture slaves to be sold to white slave traders.52 This
outsourced rendition was efficacious. The Atlantic slave trade forcibly transported millions of blacks to the New World with
450,000 shipped to the United States.53
This massive rendition program was a lawful enterprise because *38 the slave trade was enabled by the U.S. Constitution.54 The
Constitution protected the slave trade by stipulating that Congress could not ban the slave trade until 180855 and that the
ban-prohibition language could not be amended.56
2. Continuing the Rendition of Blacks
The Atlantic slave trade ended in 1808,57 but the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause continued the rendition of blacks.58 The
Clause declared that a black person “held to Service or Labour” (i.e., enslaved) in one state who escapes to another state
remains enslaved and “shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”59 The
subsequent Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 strengthened the Fugitive Slave Clause.60 The 1850 Act appointed federal
commissioners who could create a posse or enlist the militia or army to hunt down escaped slaves. Additionally, the Act
declared, “all good citizens are hereby commanded to aid and assist in the prompt and efficient execution of this law.”61
3. Suppressing Black Insurrections
Blacks fought against the slave system in various ways including disobedience, petty theft, running away, and insurrection.62
The highest form of resistance was insurrection because success was unlikely and failure meant death.63 Despite probable
failure, blacks actively resisted with over 200 reported slave insurrections occurring during the two centuries prior to the Civil
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War.64 Whites greatly feared black insurrections and brutally repressed them.65 In one insurrection attempt *39 in 1811, Charles
Deslondes, a slave, led two hundred other slaves and marched toward New Orleans, burning three plantations and killing a
number of whites. White military forces repressed the insurrection and killed up to a hundred slaves.66
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine calls for using all tools of national power to suppress uprisings.67 Whites during the slavery
period used all tools of national power including laws to suppress black uprisings. Alabama’s 1833 code, for example,
authorized death for any slave who consulted, advised, or conspired to “rebel” or “make insurrection.”68 Georgia’s 1845 law
stated, “[e]xciting an insurrection or revolt of slaves, or any attempt by writing, speaking, or otherwise, to excite an insurrection
or revolt of slaves, shall be punished with death.”69
The U.S. Constitution also sought to control black insurrections. Constitutional authority for the federal government to
“suppress insurrections”70 included suppressing black insurrections.71 Likewise, constitutional authority for the federal
government to protect states “against domestic violence”72 included protecting against domestic slave rebellions.73
4. Patrolling Blacks
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine instructs U.S. forces to “[e]stablish patrolling tactics that deter enemy attacks.”74 U.S. forces
should constantly patrol day and night to thwart enemy operations.75 Whites during the slavery period instituted slave patrols to
suppress black resistance.76 Efforts to patrol blacks predate the founding of the United States. By 1671, South Carolina had a
Charleston Town Watch staffed by constables and citizens searching for signs of trouble *40 including slave gatherings.77 Later,
South Carolina’s 1690 Act for the Better Ordering of Slaves required all persons to “arrest and chastise any slave out of his
home plantation without a proper pass.”78 In 1704, South Carolina formed its first official slave patrols to suppress
insurrections.79 In 1721, the law was modified to “prevent all caballings amongst negros, by dispersing of them when drumming
or playing, and to search all negro houses for arms or other offensive weapons.”80
Slave patrols in Virginia began when the Virginia legislature in 1691 required sheriffs to raise posses to capture runaway
slaves.81 This duty was transferred to the Virginia militia in 1727, thus creating Virginia’s first slave patrol. After a failed black
rebellion in 1730, sporadic patrols turned into regular patrols conducting reconnaissance two or three times a week.82
Other colonies enacted similar laws.83 During the antebellum period, all Southern states had white patrols. Slaveowners were
obligated to serve on patrols. Each patrol had four to twelve members with one designated as the captain. Each slave patrol
member usually rode at least once every two weeks.84 They “scoured the countryside day and night, intimidating, terrorizing,
and brutalizing slaves into submission and meekness.”85 Former slave Ida Henry recalled a white patrol who assaulted her
mother:
De patrollers wouldn’t allow de slaves to hold night services, and one night dey caught me mother out praying.
Dey stripped her naked and tied her hands together wid a rope tied to de handcuffs and threw one end of de rope
over a limb and tied de other end to de pummel of a saddle on a horse. As me mother weighed ‘bout 200, dey
pulled her up so dat her toes could barely touch de ground and whipped her.86

The laws sanctioned such use of violence by white patrols. The *41 laws of some states--North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia--allowed slave patrols to seize slaves traveling without a pass or after curfew and to summarily whip them.87
5. Disarming Blacks
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine calls for the controlling power to monopolize the use of force.88 Disarming the targeted
population is the “most vital step” to ensure tranquility.89 The laws should forbid the targeted population from possessing
weapons and punish those who violate the weapons ban.90 The objective is for counterinsurgents to control the entire legal
supply of weapons.91 This objective was attempted during the Iraq War. Disarming the Iraqi population was a major goal of U.S.
forces early on in post-Saddam Iraq.92 Paul L. Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, sought to pacify Iraq
by disarming enemy militias.93
Likewise, whites sought to pacify blacks by disarming them. A 1723 Virginia law prohibited blacks from keeping or carrying
“guns, gunpowder, shot, or clubs”-- even for self-defense.94 The slave code of the District of Columbia declared: “No negro or
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other slave within this province shall be permitted to carry any gun, or any other offensive weapon, from off their master’s land
without license from their said master ....”95 Violation of this provision entailed whipping and seizure of the weapons.96 An
Alabama law stated: “No slave shall keep or carry any gun, powder, shot, club, or other weapon whatsoever, *42 offensive or
defensive, except the tools given him to work with ....”97 Under the slave codes of Kentucky, Virginia, and Missouri, a slave was
subject to thirty-nine lashes for keeping a gun or other weapons.98
Whites shuddered at the thought of large numbers of armed blacks.99 George Washington, who commanded the Continental
Army during the Revolutionary War, banned all blacks, both free and slave, from enlisting.100 When Congress suggested that
states recruit slaves to help fight the British, Christopher Gadsden, a leader of the Revolution from South Carolina, wrote, “We
are much disgusted here at Congress recommending us to arm our Slaves.”101 According to Gadsden, “It was received with great
resentment, as a very dangerous and impolitic Step.”102
6. Prohibiting Assemblies
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine calls for restrictions on “unlawful assembly.”103 All potential enemy assemblages are to be
scrutinized and, if necessary, disbanded.104 In the counterinsurgency campaign against blacks, whites sought to keep blacks
from assembling. Alabama’s slave code of 1833 mandated that “unlawful assemblies ... by a slave or slaves, shall be punished
with stripes ....”105 Similarly, the District of Columbia’s slave code stated: “All secret or private meetings or assemblages
whatsoever, and all meetings for religious worship beyond the hour of ten o’clock at night, of free negroes, mulattoes or slaves,
shall be, and they are hereby declared to be unlawful ....”106
*43 7. Suppressing Speech
The U.S. counterinsurgency manual avoids specifically calling for restricting free speech and instead euphemistically instructs
military commanders to “shap [e] the information environment.”107 Whites in the antebellum South attempted to shape their
information environment by passing laws to suppress antislavery speech. Georgia passed legislation providing that a person
could face the death penalty for “circulating any publication for the purpose of exciting a revolt among the slaves.”108 North
Carolina imposed penalties on any person who wrote or distributed publications “to excite insurrection, conspiracy, or
resistance in the slaves or free negroes.”109 Virginia made it a felony for a person to print or distribute any writing “for the
purpose of persuading slaves to rebel.”110 Louisiana imposed imprisonment or death on any person whose statements or actions
tended to produce discontent among free blacks or insubordination among slaves.111
8. Eliminating Education
U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in the War on Terror includes initiatives involving education such as pressing Pakistan to
counter radical religious schools, called madrasas, which may teach a new generation of students to fight against America.112
During the slavery period in the United States, whites also included education in its counterinsurgency campaign. Whites
frequently prohibited blacks from receiving an education. North Carolina’s 1831 slave code preamble explained that “teaching
slaves to read and write tends to dissatisfaction in their minds, and to produce insurrection and rebellion.”113 It was a crime to
give a slave any type of book, including the Bible.114 South Carolina’s 1740 slave code stated that teaching slaves to write may
lead to “great inconveniences” and thus made it *44 unlawful for slaves or free blacks to assemble for “mental instruction.”115
Virginia’s 1819 slave code deemed it an unlawful assembly when slaves gathered to learn to read or write.116 In 1832, a Virginia
state legislator, Henry Berry, conceded that every attempt had been made to deny blacks an education. The reason, explained
Berry, was that blacks “would then be on a level with the beasts of the field, and we should be safe!”117
9. Dividing and Conquering
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine advocates a divide-and-conquer strategy that seeks “signs of division within an insurgent
movement.”118 Rifts are to be exploited. Those within the movement are to be turned into informers. The divided insurgents
become demoralized and ineffectual.119
Whites implemented a divide-and-conquer strategy against blacks.120 Slave plantations in the South were located great distances
from each other. Kinship groupings were dissolved. Slaves speaking different African languages were grouped together on
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plantations. Slave owners set up a spy network to report on conditions in the fields and the slave quarters. They recruited blacks
to spy on other blacks.121 Whites created a slave hierarchy of personal servants, household servants, drivers, and field workers
that were pitted against each other.122 The nineteenth-century black leader Frederick Douglass learned early on to “trust no man”
and that “a still tongue makes a wise head.”123
White slave owners deployed divide-and-conquer and other practices described above against blacks for over a
century-and-a-half to the end of the Civil War.124 But the Civil War did not portend the end of the war between whites and
blacks; rather, it was merely *45 another phase in the much longer counterinsurgency conflict between blacks and whites.125
B. The Civil War Period
According to U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, “insurgents may engage in conventional operations after the insurgency
develops extensive popular support and sustainment capabilities. The insurgents can then generate a conventional force ....”126
Blacks did generate a conventional force--the Northern army--by developing sufficient support from anti-slavery whites to
battle pro-slavery forces. The Civil War can be considered the “greatest and most successful slave revolt.”127 But the Civil War
victory was not decisive for blacks. In the post-Civil War period, white aggression against blacks would continue.128
C. The Post-Civil War Period
The Civil War ended de jure slavery, but blacks still had to fight for equality. In the immediate post-slavery period, Southern
states passed legislation that turned slave codes into black codes that continued suppressing blacks. Southern resurgence was
supported by President Andrew Johnson who permitted Southern states to reenter the Union on their own terms.129 Congress
passed the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 granting legal equality to all U.S. citizens,130 but President Johnson opposed the
Fourteenth Amendment and advised Southern states to not ratify it.131 These efforts against blacks were a harbinger of more
conflicts in the continuing racial counterinsurgency war.
1. Race Riots
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine advises counterinsurgents to engage in ““offensive” operations.132 Whites engaged in offensive
*46 operations against blacks despite de jure equality for blacks.133 The Civil War freed blacks, but it did not succor lasting
protection against white aggression.134 One instance of white aggression occurred in Wilmington, North Carolina, where blacks
had established a thriving, independent community.135 Whites became fearful as prosperous blacks gained political clout. On
Election Day in 1898, whites threatened blacks who sought to vote. After the election, whites threatened a black activist with
lynching. The Wilmington Light Infantry and Naval Reserve marched through town looking for him. When he was not found,
a white mob attacked black residents by shooting them and burning their homes.136 An estimated 120 to 150 people died--most
of them black.137 This was but one of many instances of racial violence that occurred after the Civil War. From 1866 to the end
of World War II, race riots flared in New Orleans, Atlanta, Springfield, East St. Louis, Washington, Chicago, Mobile,
Beaumont, Detroit, and Harlem. These were large-scale riots involving millions of dollars in property damage and many
deaths.138
2. Racial Cleansings
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine states that one effective method of combating the enemy is to “clear” an area.139 To “clear” is to
remove enemy forces from an area by capturing or forcing the withdrawal of insurgents.140 In the war on blacks, whites engaged
in “clear” operations through ““racial cleansing” campaigns that cleared entire counties or towns of blacks.141 Even after slavery
was abolished, racial cleansings were possible because white laws and courts still advantaged whites and disadvantaged
blacks.142 Between the Civil War and the 1920s, whites in many areas forced out the entire black population.143 Cleansings
occurred throughout America, especially in *47 the North, Midwest, and South.144
Racial cleansing differed from other kinds of white violence in that the intent was to purge entire areas of blacks.145 Census data
illustrates sharp drops in the black population in racially-cleansed areas.146 One newspaper’s account of a racial cleansing
episode in Missouri read: “MISSOURI MOB’S WORK, Kills Three Negroes, Burns Their Homes and Drives Every Negro Out
of Pierce City.” The story reported that for nearly fifteen hours, a mob of armed whites seized control of the city to drive out
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every black person.147 In another episode in 1919 in Corbin, Kentucky, the racial cleansing began due to allegations of two black
men mugging a white man. A white mob drove out nearly all blacks. A few months after the racial cleansing, a black resident
stated in a signed affidavit, “They swore at us and said: ‘By God we are going to run all Negroes out of this town tonight.”’148
Areas that were racially cleansed remain cleansed to this day.149
3. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) Versus Blacks
The U.S. counterinsurgency manual explains that counterinsurgency operations include the application of paramilitary
actions.150 Whites applied paramilitary actions against blacks by using the Ku Klux Klan to terrorize blacks.151 The KKK is a
paramilitary organization with a military hierarchy.152 Former Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest was the Klan’s
Grand Wizard in 1867.153
After the Civil War, Klan violence spread throughout the South.154 In one attack in 1871 in South Carolina, Klan members in
disguise terrorized Elias Hill, a black Baptist preacher they considered “uppity” because he forcefully advocated Union
policies.155 The Klansmen broke through his door at night, carried him outside, accused *48 him of starting fires in the
community, struck him with their fists, pointed pistols at him, and threatened to shoot him. The leader of the Klan group then
whipped Hill. “He had a horsewhip, and he told me to pull up my shirt, and he hit me ... I made a moan every time he cut me
with the horsewhip,” recounted Hill.156 He survived only because he told his attackers he would renounce the Union cause and
no longer vote or preach.157
The Grant administration initially prosecuted Klansmen, but curtailed its efforts toward the end of 1872 when Northern
sentiment shifted towards forging peace with the South and avoiding continuing federal interference in Southern affairs.158
Other white supremacist groups formed, including the White League in Louisiana, the White Man’s Party in Alabama, the
South Carolina Red Shirts, and numerous rifle clubs in Southern towns.159 Violence against blacks was not restricted to the
South. White hate groups assailed blacks in both Southern and Northern states.160 Their tactics included cross burnings and
lynchings.161
The KKK was resurgent in the post-World War I period of the 1920s, and at its height had three million members including
lawyers, judges, and professors. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black and Senator Robert F. Byrd had been Klan members, and
President Harry Truman before he was president almost joined the Klan.162 The Klan continues to exist. Reporter Elliot Jaspin
recounts visiting the town of Berryville, Arkansas in 1998 and not seeing one black person for days.163 He saw white shoppers,
white sales clerks, white drivers and passengers, but no blacks. On his last day in Berryville, he finally asked a person if there
were blacks in the area. “Oh no,” she replied, ““the Klan keeps them out.”164 The Klan persists as an American institution
because of its ability to adapt to each age and to recruit willing members in every generation.165
*49 4. The Police Versus Blacks
Developing an effective police force “is one of the highest priority COIN [counterinsurgency] tasks,” explains the U.S.
counterinsurgency manual.166 In the Iraq War, U.S. forces sought to create an effective, well-equipped Iraqi police force to help
defeat insurgents.167 Domestically, the United States has sought to create an effective, well-trained domestic police force to
control blacks.168 The first modern police force was South Carolina’s Charlestown Guard and Watch, organized in 1785 to
mainly control slaves.169 One guard member explained his job was “keeping down the ni[][]ers.”170
More recently, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968 in part to control “ghetto disorders.”171 The Act established a
national training center to instruct local police in riot control techniques and provided funding to local law enforcement
agencies seeking to bolster their anti-riot capabilities.”172 Also, between 1966 and 1969, California and twenty other states
passed anti-riot statutes to quell “ghetto disorders.”173
White fears of blacks have infiltrated the police force.174 In one study in the late 1960s on racial attitudes, a white respondent
conceded that predominantly white police departments believe their mission is to protect whites from blacks.175 She felt white
fears of blacks was a serious force in the white community.176 White fears were manifested in the police targeting black Muslims
in the 1960s. A secret Los Angeles Police Department report regarded black Muslim men as “extremely dangerous.”177
According to the report, they are “a type of fanatic, and are willing to die for their cause, content if they can take a caucasian,
preferably a police officer (and this includes Negro police *50 officers too), with them when they are killed.”178
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With such views of blacks, police violence against blacks is not surprising. In one case, an immigrant from Guinea, Amadou
Diallo, was shot nineteen times in 1999 by four undercover police officers because of Diallo’s blackness.179 Also, a 1999 study
found that blacks were 11.4 percent of the population but 22.6 percent of police brutality victims.180 In one police brutality case
in 1998 in Riverside, California, a nineteen-year-old black woman was shot twelve times by police officers. The officers
screamed racist comments at the victim and later celebrated her murder.181 Additionally, of those killed in encounters with the
police from 1976 to 1998, forty-two percent were black.182
The numerous cases of police violence against blacks could lead to the conclusion that the U.S. government is conducting a
“secret” war against blacks.183 Author James Baldwin viewed police officers as soldiers in a race war when he wrote about black
hatred of the abusive white police force and how the white policeman “moves through Harlem, therefore, like an occupying
soldier in a bitterly hostile country, which is precisely what, and where, he is.”184 For blacks, white police officers are
“mercenaries of the white establishment” rather than beneficent public servants.185
5. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Versus Blacks
The failure of the FBI to protect black citizens is part of a larger history in which the United States has for many centuries been
at odds with blacks and their fight for equal rights under the law.186 J. Edgar Hoover, FBI director from 1935 to 1972, cared little
about black equality and instead fixated on the communist threat.187 Hoover was obsessed with rooting out communists and
feared blacks could be *51 manipulated to serve the communist cause.188 In 1969, the FBI focused most of their
counterintelligence operations on the Black Panthers--the FBI conducted 295 counterintelligence operations and 233 were
directed against the Black Panthers.189 Hoover issued a report in 1970 declaring the Black Panther Party “the most dangerous
and violence prone of all extremist groups.”190
The FBI engaged in a pattern of systematic sabotage against black activists.191 The FBI surveilled black activists and placed the
information in the “Racial Matters” file.192 The FBI nominally investigated thousands of skirmishes between black civil right
advocates and white segregationists, but for the most part, federal agents stood by and in effect allied themselves with
segregationist forces.193 The FBI was able to contest the black struggle for equality only because presidents and other
administration officials allowed and encouraged the FBI to do so.194 The executive branch’s support of FBI misconduct makes
the history of the FBI “the history of a government at war with its own citizens.”195
6. The Military Versus Blacks
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine envisions military forces supporting other institutional actors, such as the police, in carrying
out counterinsurgent missions.196 Whites did use the military to help overcome the black insurgency. The Fugitive Slave Act of
1850 authorized the use of federal troops to advance into Northern states to pursue blacks escaping slavery.197 The Act
appointed federal commissioners throughout the nation who could call on the army to pursue escaping slaves.198
*52 The military was also used against blacks in 1919 in Phillips County, Arkansas, when white landlords resisted efforts by
black tenant farmers to unionize and seek concessions.199 Blacks and whites armed themselves and violence ensued. Governor
Charles H. Brough and other whites requested federal help to deal with the “negro uprising.”200 Secretary of War Newton D.
Baker authorized full use of federal troops to suppress the disturbance.201 On arrival, federal troops began to disarm blacks and
whites. Later, when investigating reports of black outlaws, federal troops became embroiled in a firefight with armed blacks
that resulted in the wounding of some federal troops and roughly fifty blacks.202 In another encounter, federal troops killed
approximately twenty armed blacks ostensibly for refusing to halt or resisting arrest.203 The total estimated number of blacks
killed in Phillips County range from a low of fifty-three to a high of 200.204
During the 1967 Detroit riot, National Guard troops were mobilized. One National Guard member announced, “I’m gonna
shoot anything that moves and is black.”205 Tanks were deployed and shot at buildings indiscriminately to hunt for snipers as the
death toll rose.206 The U.S. military regarded any riot requiring federal intervention to be handled like a military operation
against a foreign enemy.207
7. Intelligence Operations Against Blacks
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The U.S. counterinsurgency manual discusses collecting intelligence information on insurgents.208 In the white
counterinsurgency campaign, whites collected intelligence on blacks. A case in point is the Mississippi State Sovereignty
Commission, an official government agency that surveilled blacks for over two decades from 1956 to 1977.209 The Commission
was a high-level state agency whose members included the governor, attorney general, senate *53 president, and house
speaker.210 The Commission was created when Mississippi Governor J.P. Coleman signed House Bill 880 into law in 1956.211
The law endowed the Commission with “full power and authority to do and perform any and all acts and things deemed
necessary and proper” to fulfill its mandate.212 The law further authorized the Commission to “do and perform any and all acts
and things deemed necessary and proper to protect the sovereignty of the State of Mississippi, and her sister states, from
encroachment thereon by the Federal Government ....”213
The mission of this government-funded covert ops agency was to disrupt the civil rights movement.214 It colluded with local law
enforcement agencies and FBI agents to target blacks and civil right activists.215 One instance of collusion is revealed in a
Commission letter addressed to “Honorable Wm. T. Ferrell, Sheriff and Tax Collector” asking the sheriff to “furnish this
commission with information on A.C. Curtis, male, colored, ... as to any information you may have regarding this subject’s
activity with the NAACP, if any, or other subversive organizations.”216 Months later, a Commission operative traveling to
Natchez to personally assess the situation wrote in his report that “Deputy Robinson stated he and Sheriff Ferrell were keeping
a close watch on any activity that might come from the NAACP ....”217
8. Lynchings
The U.S. military’s counterinsurgency manual discusses “neutralizing” the enemy and ensuring enemy fighters are “killed
outright.”218 Whites neutralized blacks and killed them outright by lynching them. White attackers lynched 3,446 blacks
between 1882 and 1968.219 Lynching was a white tool of violence encompassing not *54 only the rope used to hang a black
person, but also the authority to kill without legal repercussions.220 Allen D. Candler, the governor of Georgia from 1898 to
1902, approved of lynching to control black criminals.221 Southern states protected lynching by opposing anti-lynching bills
throughout the 1920s and 1930s.222 In one case involving a black suspect alleged to have killed a white family, an editorial
declared the crime “so unbearably aggravating that the people cannot be expected to wait with patience on the laggard process
of the courts.”223 It was only in 1946 that a white person was convicted in federal court of lynching.224 White support for lynching
made it an effective weapon of social control over blacks.225
9. The Death Penalty
The U.S. counterinsurgency manual extols the importance of policing efforts and explains how laws, courts, and the penal
system can be helpful props for the police.226 The current death penalty system can be considered a prop supporting America’s
long-term suppression effort against blacks.227 For example, Louisiana’s Act of 1843 imposed the death penalty on any slave
who promoted “insurrection or revolt.” After slavery ended, white southerners believed capital punishment was needed to
control primitive blacks.228 Capital punishment, like lynching, is a tool of control used against blacks.229
Racially motivated lynchings have led to racially-biased death penalty executions.230 Today, key decision makers in death
penalty cases are white. A 1998 report revealed that of the chief District Attorneys in counties with the death penalty, almost
ninety-eight *55 percent were white and only one percent were black.231 The death penalty system is further biased because
blacks are routinely excluded from death penalty juries.232 Also, one study by Professor David Baldus concluded that a person
was 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty in Georgia if the person killed a white victim than if the person killed a
black victim.233
The result is the disproportionate use of the death penalty against black men.234 One editorial noted that since 1976, thirty-five
percent of those executed have been blacks even though they constitute only 12.6 percent of the population.235 A 2010 article
revealed that blacks constituted forty-nine percent of the inmates on federal death row.236 In Harris County, Texas, twelve of the
last thirteen defendants subject to the death penalty were black.237
10. The Prison System
U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine recognizes the importance of prison officials and detention facilities in supporting efforts to
control insurgents.238 Domestically, efforts to control blacks have led to the United States imprisoning “a larger percentage of its
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black population than South Africa did at the height of apartheid.”239 In Washington *56 D.C., it is estimated that three out of
four young black men will serve time in prison.240 Similar numbers exist in other black communities throughout America.241
More black men are ensnared within the U.S. criminal justice system (i.e., in prison, on probation, or on parole) than were in
slavery in 1850.242 The 2010 Census Bureau numbers show that blacks constitute 13.6 percent of the U.S. population,243 whereas
Federal Bureau of Prison statistics reveal black inmates constitute 37.3 percent of the federal prison population.244 The racial
caste system perdures through a criminal justice system that labels people of color as “criminals,” imprisons them, and deprives
them of their rights.245
11. The War on Drugs
The U.S. counterinsurgency manual posits that the military’s primary function in counterinsurgency is to protect the
populace.246 In the United States, the effort to protect the white populace has produced a war on drugs that is effectively a war on
blacks.247 The Reagan administration promoted its drug war policy through a media campaign involving stories of black crack
users and crack dealers in ghetto communities.248 A study of network television news from 1990 to 1991 found that the drug
issue was presented as an “us versus them” story with “us” as white, suburban America and “them” as mostly blacks along with
a few errant whites.249
Blacks have become the enemy in the war on drugs, and this war disproportionately imprisons blacks and destroys black
communities.250 In the war on drugs, blacks have been investigated, detained, arrested *57 and charged in disproportionate
numbers for using, possessing, and selling illicit drugs.251 Additionally, the imprisonment rate for drug charges is twenty to fifty
times greater for black men than for white men252 even though people of all colors use and sell illicit drugs at similar rates.253
The war on drugs has led to the militarization of police departments and the use of military-style tactics against black
communities.254 President Ronald Reagan’s declaration of war on drugs in 1982 included military terms such as “battle,” “war,”
and “surrender.”255 Paramilitary police units called Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams were created and regularly
used in drug raids.256 Militarization continued with the 1994 Memorandum of Understanding between the Justice Department
and the Department of Defense, which allowed police departments access to high-tech military weapons such as grenade
launchers and armored personnel carriers.257 The war on drugs continues despite its deleterious effects on blacks.258
V. SUSTAINING THE COUNTERINSURGENCY
The U.S. counterinsurgency manual advises counterinsurgents to prepare for a long-term commitment and to sustain that
commitment against insurgents.259 Whites have conducted a long-term, sustained campaign against blacks that endures to this
day.260 Racial inequality remains in the legal system.261 Whites continue to stereotype blacks, especially black males, as violent
and dangerous.262 The number of hate groups continues to rise.263 White supremacists continue to prepare for *58 a race war.264
They strengthen their capabilities by enlisting in the military or recruiting returning military veterans to capitalize on their
military experience.265
Anti-black violence is enduring and pervasive.266 Blacks are likely targets of racially motivated hate crimes.267 In Arizona from
1992 to 2006, seventy-four percent of racially motivated hate crimes were against blacks, but blacks constituted only 3.6
percent of the Arizona population.268 In Idaho, in 2003, sixty percent of the racially motivated hate crimes were against blacks,
but blacks constituted only 0.6 percent of the Idaho population.269
Blacks experience a consistently high pattern of hate crime victimization.270 In 2003, sixty-six percent of the 3,844 racially
motivated hate crimes were against blacks. In 2004, sixty-eight percent of the 4,042 racially motivated hate crimes were against
blacks. In 2005, sixty-seven percent of the 3,919 racially motivated hate crimes were against blacks.271
The election of President Barack Obama did not end the conflict between blacks and whites. First, Obama himself cautioned
that racial problems stemming from a history of oppression against blacks “aren’t just solved by electing a black president.”272
Second, Barack Obama won not because of racial equality; he won despite racial inequality. His campaign had to overcome
doubts about his origins and loyalties, questions about a black person’s ability to lead a nation, resentment of an “uppity” black
man, hypercritical critiques of his perceived mistakes, and other “Negrophobia” manifestations.273 Third, elected black
officeholders are not immune from racial discrimination. During *59 the Nixon administration, for example, black elected
officials were singled out for investigation by the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Internal Revenue Service,
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federal criminal task forces, and postal inspectors.274 Fourth, black exceptionalism does not mean racial conflict has ended
because individual black success stories existed even during slavery.275 In fact, black exceptionalism can be manipulated to
perpetuate inequality by justifying the mass incarceration of blacks. According to this view, successful blacks mean race is no
longer a problem and those blacks in prison are there because they chose their fate and not because of systemic racial bias.276
Finally, the number of ultra-right-wing militias and white power organizations sharply increased after Obama was elected
president in 2008.277 A 2009 report by the Department of Homeland Security states that the election of President Barack Obama
is “a driving force for rightwing extremist recruitment and radicalization.”278
The U.S. counterinsurgency advises commanders to gain the advantage by adapting to changing circumstances.279 Accordingly,
whites could perceive Obama’s election as a mere changed circumstance they will adapt to so as to gain an advantage in the
continuing conflict between whites and blacks.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Understanding white and black relations as a white counterinsurgency campaign produces the following policy considerations.
First, recognize that the war on blacks has led to blacks suffering from the “Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome.”280 Second,
provide blacks with benefits similar to benefits provided to veterans.281*60 Finally, establish an African American Redress
Commission to thoroughly research the legacies of white oppression.282 Such efforts are needed to prevent racial conflict from
continuing in the twenty-first century.283
A. Recognizing Post-Traumatic Slave Syndrome
Veterans returning from a war environment are susceptible to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a condition recognized as
caused by war-related trauma.284 Similarly, blacks subjected to continual white violence since slavery are susceptible to “Post
Traumatic Slave Syndrome.”285 This syndrome is caused by white attacks on the black person’s body, mind, and spirit.286
Generations of such attacks traumatized an entire population and bequeathed damaged legacies to future black generations.287
Some stressors that justify the diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder include a serious threat or harm to one’s life or
physical integrity: a threat or harm to one’s children, spouse or close relative; sudden destruction of one’s home or community;
or seeing another person injured or killed as a result of physical violence.288 Blacks have been subjected to these stressors for
generations in a white-dominated society.289 The effect is multigenerational trauma that debilitates blacks today.290
B. Providing Veteran-Type Benefits
Congressman William L. Clay declared that blacks have been engaged in a long and “bloody war” instigated by whites.291
Accordingly, blacks should be regarded as veterans and receive *61 benefits similar to veterans to restore to blacks their
rightful compensation. The G.I. Bill helps veterans pay for the cost of education.292 Likewise, legislation should be enacted that
helps blacks pay for the cost of education. Further, veterans applying for government jobs receive extra points that, while not
guaranteeing them employment, do recognize their service defending against America’s enemies.293 Blacks seeking
employment should also receive points that recognize their unique struggle defending against abiding individual and
institutional racial injustice. Finally, veterans are entitled to low-cost housing loan guarantees.294 Blacks should also be entitled
to this loan-guarantee benefit. If veterans serving years or decades in the military are entitled to benefits, then blacks subjected
to targeted attacks for centuries are even more so entitled to benefits.
C. Establishing the African American Redress Commission
The centuries-long war on blacks took from them their lives, labor, culture, and more.295 U.S. policymakers are obligated to
restore to blacks what has been taken from them.296 Restorative justice requires the actor who does harm to take action to
remedy that harm.297 Congress can take a step towards remedying the harm to blacks by creating a bipartisan African American
Redress Commission comprised of members from the fields of law, social sciences, and economics.298 This Commission would
supervise regional roundtables that research, investigate, and hold public community hearings on the legacy of America’s
repression of blacks.299 The information gathered would be used to establish recommendations that could restore to blacks what
has been taken from them.300
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VII. CONCLUSION
The counterinsurgency campaign against blacks is a reminder that the powerful will always use its might against the less
powerful. In *62 America, predominant whites used their power against marginalized blacks in an enduring counterinsurgency
struggle that attempted to suppress the quest for equality by insurgent blacks. In this counterinsurgency, the controlling whites
turned law into another instrument of power against blacks. To prevail, blacks must resist and attain power because “white
Americans will only accede to black Americans those rights which [blacks] can negotiate through pressure ....”301 Acquiring the
ability to negotiate through pressure will enable blacks to implement policies restoring to them what rightfully belongs to them.
The Global War on Terror with its counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan has been termed the “Long War.”302
The counterinsurgency campaign against blacks spans centuries and thus can be termed the “Longer War.” Just as great effort is
being expended to end the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, greater effort should be expended to end the longer war at home.
Doing so might make it more possible to achieve the end state described in the U.S. counterinsurgency manual--a legitimate
and secure society supported by the populace.303
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